Santa Clara Journal of International Law
Volume 4 | Issue 1

Article 1

1-1-2006

Patent Controls on GM Crop Farming
Janice M. Mueller

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil
Recommended Citation
Janice M. Mueller, Patent Controls on GM Crop Farming, 4 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 1 (2006).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil/vol4/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

Vol. 4 [2006]

SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
www.scu.edu/scjil

1

PATENT CONTROLS ON GM CROP FARMING
Janice M. Mueller1
I. INTRODUCTION
Patents on genetically modified (GM) crop technology arm their
owners with powerful control over farmers’ ability to grow, harvest,
distribute, and profit from GM crops. No clearer example exists than the
April 2004 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling (McFarling II),2 in which the court upheld
Monsanto’s patent licensing practice of forbidding farmers to save seed
from GM crops for replanting. McFarling II thus confirms the illegality
of a custom engaged in by farmers for centuries.3 The Federal Circuit’s
1

Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. E-mail:
mueller@law.pitt.edu. I am grateful to the participants in “The Future of Food–Legal
and Ethical Challenges” conference held at Santa Clara University on April 15, 2005 for
their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.

2

See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 2956 (2005) [hereinafter McFarling II] (opinion authored by Circuit Judge Clevenger
for a panel also including Circuit Judge Lourie and Senior Circuit Judge Plager). An
earlier Federal Circuit decision in the same matter upheld a district court’s preliminary
injunction of McFarling. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
[hereinafter McFarling I].
3

The saving and replanting of seed is a custom of ancient lineage. See Jeremy P. Oczek,
In the Aftermath of the "Terminator" Technology Controversy: Intellectual Property
Protections for Genetically Engineered Seeds and the Right to Save and Replant Seed, 41
B.C. L. REV. 627, 647 (2000) (noting that “[e]ver since humans began the transition from
nomadic herders to farmers, saving seed for planting the following year's crop has been a
basic tenet in the practice of agriculture.”) (citing Laurent Belsie, Plants Without Seeds
Challenge Historic Farming Practices, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 30, 1998, at B4).
This custom is reflected in the exemption for seed-saving included in the U.S. Plant
Variety Protection Act (PVPA) of 1970. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2005) (providing in part
that “[e]xcept to the extent that such action may constitute an infringement under
subsections (3) and (4) of section 111 [7 U.S.C.S. § 2541(3) and (4)], it shall not infringe
any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by the person from seed obtained,
or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding
purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on the farm of the
person, or for sale as provided in this section.”).

Vol. 4 [2006]

PATENT CONTROLS ON GM CROP FARMING
Janice M. Mueller

2

conclusion that Monsanto’s restriction on planting saved seed does not
violate the antitrust laws nor amount to patent misuse deserves further
scrutiny, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s invitation to the Acting
Solicitor General to file an amicus brief in McFarling II.4 This paper
details the facts of McFarling II and critiques the Federal Circuit’s
analysis of the unique patent and antitrust law issues raised thereby.
II. Facts of Monsanto v. McFarling
Homan McFarling, a Mississippi soybean farmer, obtained 1000
bags of Monsanto’s Roundup Ready® (RR) soybean seed from his local
seed store.5 This seed is genetically modified so that the soybean plants
The 1985 advent of U.S. utility patent protection for seeds and plants provided a
stronger form of protection than the PVPA that was particularly useful for genetically
engineered crops. See Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Bd.Pat.App. & Int. 1985)
(rejecting USPTO examiner’s position that plants and seeds protectable under the PVPA
or the Plant Patent Act (PPA) of 1930 could not also qualify as subject matter eligible for
utility patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101). In McFarling II, the Federal Circuit
confirmed that U.S. utility patent protection of seeds is not subject to the seed-saving
exemption found in the PVPA. See McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1344 (concluding that in
light of Supreme Court’s interpretation in J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001), of Congress’s intent in enacting the PVPA, “Congress
did not intend to prohibit owners of utility patents from enforcing seed-saving
prohibitions in their licenses”); see also Mark D. Janis, Supplemental Forms of
Intellectual Property Protection for Plants, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 305, 311 (2004).
4

McFarling filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court on July 6, 2004. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McFarling v. Monsanto Co., No. 04-31, 2004 WL
1535852 (S. Ct. July 6, 2004). The Supreme Court thereafter invited the Acting Solicitor
General to file a brief in the case expressing the views of the United States. McFarling v.
Monsanto Co., 125 S. Ct. 348 (2004). The United States recommended denial of
certiorari, primarily on the ground that the Federal Circuit’s decision “involve[d] a
narrow application of established legal principles to a specific factual context involving a
self-replicating product.” Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 10, McFarling v.
Monsanto Co., No. 04-31, 2005 WL 1277857 (S. Ct. May 27, 2005). The Supreme Court
subsequently denied certiorari. McFarling v. Monsanto Co., 125 S. Ct. 2956 (2005).
5

The transaction is arranged such that instead of purchasing the seeds outright, the
farmer merely obtains a license to use the seeds subject to certain restrictions on that use.
Software manufacturers similarly use “shrink-wrap” licenses to convey software to users

2
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grown therefrom will be resistant to Monsanto’s Roundup® herbicide.6
Monsanto owns several patents directed to the gene modification
technology7 and licenses the patents to approximately 200 seed
manufacturers (denominated Monsanto’s “seed partners”), which insert
the patented trait (glyphosate resistance) into unmodified soybeans. As a
condition of obtaining the resulting GM seed, McFarling had to sign
Monsanto’s Technology Agreement. In exchange for the “opportunity to
purchase and plant seed containing” the RR technology, a farmer signing
the Technology Agreement agrees inter alia “to not save any crop
produced from this seed for replanting.”8 Because he cannot save the
“second-generation” seed and use it for the following season’s planting,
without “selling” the software to them. If these transactions involved true sales, the
exhaustion of rights and/or first sale doctrines would otherwise prohibit the vendor’s
imposition of post-sale restrictions.
6

Currently, 60% of all soybeans grown are transgenic. Herbicide tolerant soybeans are
the most dominant of all biotech crops, accounting for 48.4 million hectares worldwide.
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Dominant Biotech
Crops, 2004 (chart),
http://www.isaaa.org/kc/CBTNews/press_release/briefs32/figures/dominant_crops.jpg
(last visited Sept. 17, 2005).

7

Two patents directed to various aspects of the RR seed technology are at issue in
McFarling II. Monsanto’s U.S. Pat. No. 5,633,435 (‘435 patent) relates to the gene
encoding a modified form of the enzyme 5-enolpyruvyl-shikimate-3-phosphate synthase
(EPSPS). Naturally-occurring, unmodified EPSPS is inhibited by glyphosate, the active
ingredient in Roundup® herbicide. The modified form of EPSPS is not affected by the
presence of glyphosate, and performs the same sugar-conversion function, necessary for
plant growth, that is carried out by naturally occurring EPSPS. The ‘435 patent claims
the isolated DNA molecule encoding the modified EPSPS; a glyphosate-tolerant plant
cell comprising that DNA molecule; a glyphosate- tolerant plant comprising that plant
cell; a seed of a glyphosate-tolerant plant; a particular transgenic soybean plant; and a
method of producing genetically transformed plants which are tolerant toward glyphosate
herbicide. See McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1338-39.
Monsanto’s U.S. Pat. No. 5,352,605 (‘605 patent) relates to the use of a
particular promoter in genetically modified plant cells. The ‘605 patent claims inter alia
DNA sequences and plant cells containing the promoter (a promoter sequence is a DNA
sequence located in proximity to the DNA sequence that encodes a protein and that, in
part, tells the cellular machinery how much of the protein to make). Id.

8

McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1339.
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the farmer must purchase new “first-generation” RR seed for planting each
season (so long as he wants to continue growing RR soybeans).
Contrary to the terms of the Technology Agreement, during two
successive growing seasons McFarling saved the second-generation seed
from his soybean crop and replanted it. This generated new soybean
plants having the patented genetic makeup and herbicide resistance.9
Monsanto sued McFarling, alleging that in saving and replanting he had
infringed Monsanto’s ‘435 and ‘605 patents and had breached the
Technology Agreement. Siding with Monsanto, a federal district court
granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, imposed
liquidated damages on McFarling in the amount of $780,000, and rejected
McFarling’s counterclaims and defenses that the Technology Agreement
provisions violated the antitrust laws and constituted patent misuse by
Monsanto.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, McFarling argued that the
Technology Agreement’s prohibition on saving and replanting seeds was a
form of illegal tying,10 which constituted both a violation of the antitrust
laws11 and patent misuse.12 McFarling took the position that illegal tying

9

Cf. id. at 1343 (noting that first- and second-generation seeds “are nearly identical
copies”).

10

A tying arrangement is “an agreement by a party to sell one product . . . on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that
he will not purchase that [tied] product from any other supplier.” See Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992). The “essential characteristic
of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying
product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not
want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms. When such
‘forcing’ is present, competition on the merits in the market for the tied item is restrained
and the Sherman Act is violated.” Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S.
2, 12 (1984).

11

Section One of the Sherman Act declares illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). The courts have construed

4
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occurred when Monsanto required that farmers purchase new RR seed (the
“tied” product) as a condition of obtaining a license under the Monsanto
patents to “use” the patented technology (i.e., the Roundup® herbicide
resistance trait) in growing their soybean crop.

In other words, by

asserting its patent-based dominance in the market for the patented genetic
modification, Monsanto was improperly dampening competition in the
market for the seed.
McFarling urged that Monsanto could have chosen a less
restrictive alternative to the tying arrangement. This alternative would
have allowed farmers to save the second-generation seed and replant it, so
long as the farmers paid Monsanto the appropriate technology fee for the
amount of seed saved each season.

Instead, Monsanto’s Technology

Agreement forced the farmers to buy new RR seed each season, which
(according to McFarling) was much more expensive than replanting and
resulted in subsidizing the seed companies.
The Federal Circuit rejected McFarling’s tying theory. McFarling
had not raised a “typical” tying allegation, in which a patentee conditions
the grant of a patent license on a licensee’s purchase of an unpatented
material for use in the invention; in this case the second-generation RR
seed was also the subject of the licensed Monsanto patents.13 According
to the Federal Circuit, McFarling’s proposed less restrictive alternative of
saving/replanting the second-generation seed and paying a commensurate
§ 1 as prohibiting only unreasonable restraints of trade, rather than interpreting the
statutory language in its fullest, literal extent.
12

The Federal Circuit observed that in determining whether a patentee has committed
patent misuse, “the key inquiry is whether, by imposing conditions that derive their force
from the patent, the patentee has impermissibly broadened the scope of the patent grant
with anticompetitive effect.” McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1341.

13

Id. at 1342.
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technology fee would amount to granting him a compulsory license to use
the patent rights in conjunction with the second-generation seed.14
Reaffirming its earlier broad pronouncements concerning a patent owner’s
right to refuse to license patented material,15 the Federal Circuit “declined
to hold that Monsanto’s raw exercise of its right to exclude from the
patented invention by itself is a ‘tying’ arrangement that exceeds the scope
of the patent grant.”16
While rejecting McFarling’s tying theory, the Federal Circuit also
took issue with certain of Monsanto’s characterizations of its licensing
practices.

Monsanto had urged that its prohibition on saving and

replanting the second-generation seed was a permissible “field of use”
restriction on the patented first-generation seed.17 The Federal Circuit
disagreed, explaining that Monsanto’s Technology Agreement did not
impose a restriction on the use of the product purchased under the license

14

Id.

15

See CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (refusing to
inquire into patentee’s “subjective motivation for exerting his statutory rights, even
though his refusal to sell or license his patented invention may have an anticompetitive
effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is not illegally extended beyond the statutory
patent grant.”).

16

McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1342.

17

A typical field of use restriction in a patent license is a restraint on the licensee’s
freedom to use the patented technology for particular purposes. For example, a license
for technology to produce a GM crop might limit the licensee to use of the patented
technology in the growing of a particular crop, such as soybeans or corn. Territorial
(geographic) restrictions on a licensee’s use of a patented invention are also frequently
encountered. Generally, so long as the field of use and territorial restrictions appear in a
vertical licensing arrangement (where the patent owner and licensee are not competitors),
and where the licensee is not prohibited from using alternative noninfringing technology
or developing its own noninfringing technology, the restrictions will not be deemed
anticompetitive restraints of trade. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.3 (1995)
[hereinafter Licensing Guidelines], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.

6
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(i.e., the first-generation seed), as would a conventional field of use
restriction, but rather imposed a restriction on the use of the goods made
by the licensed product (i.e., the second-generation seed). The Federal
Circuit admitted that the propriety of such a restraint in a patent license
was an open question, for its case law had “not addressed in general terms
the status of such restrictions placed on goods made by, yet not
incorporating, the licensed good under the patent misuse doctrine.”18
Monsanto’s licensing restriction was saved in the Federal Circuit’s
view, however, by the unique facts of this case; namely, that the licensed
and patented product (the first-generation seed) and the goods made by the
licensed product (the second-generation seed) were “nearly identical
copies” that were both within the literal scope of Monsanto’s ‘435 patent.
According to the Federal Circuit, this unique circumstance meant that the
licensing restrictions on the use of goods produced by the licensed product
were not beyond the scope of the patent grant at issue.19 Therefore, patent
misuse was not established.
Having dismissed McFarling’s patent misuse defense, the Federal
Circuit quickly rejected his antitrust counterclaim.

“[B]ecause we have

found McFarling’s allegations insufficient to present a genuine issue of
material fact concerning whether Monsanto’s licensing restrictions went
beyond the boundaries of its patent grant, McFarling’s antitrust
counterclaim also fails.”20 In this case, the Federal Circuit concluded, “the
anticompetitive effect of which McFarling complains is part and parcel of
the patent system’s role in creating incentives for potential inventors.”21
18

McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1343.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id.
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To establish illegal tying under the antitrust laws, the claimant
must establish that the tying and tied products are in fact separate
products.22 The Federal Circuit agreed with McFarling that the district
court had erred by failing to consider consumer demand in the course of
concluding that the tying product (the patented trait) and the tied product
(the seed) were not two separate markets. However, the Federal Circuit
observed, “the district court’s finding concerning the unified nature of the
market for the trait and the seed is not relevant to our holding, so we
expressly decline to reach or review it.”23
Although it sustained McFarling’s liability for breach of the
Technology Agreement, the Federal Circuit did vacate the district court’s
award of $780,000 in damages to Monsanto.24 The liquidated damages
clause in the Technology Agreement was invalid and unenforceable under
Missouri law as applied to McFarling’s breach of replanting of saved seed.
The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court for
determination of actual damages.
III. McFarling’s Petition for Certiorari
McFarling filed a petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court
on July 6, 2004.25 The Questions Presented were as follows:

22

See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984) (explaining that
“a tying arrangement cannot exist unless two separate product markets have been
linked.”).

23

McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1344.

24

Id. at 1344-52.

25

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McFarling v. Monsanto Co., No. 04-31, 2004 WL
1535852 (S. Ct. July 6, 2004).

8
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1. May a patent holder lawfully prohibit
farmers from saving and replanting seed as a
condition to the purchase of patented
technology?
2. Does obtaining patents on products which
are the subject of licensing agreements
afford an absolute defense to any claim that
the licensing agreements violate the
Sherman Act?26
McFarling’s arguments for grant of certiorari focused largely on
the economic impact of Monsanto’s licensing practices, which McFarling
asserted the Federal Circuit had erroneously failed to consider:
The heart of McFarling's argument is that
agreements to prohibit seed-saving are an
unreasonable restraint of trade, since the
farmer is not allowed to purchase the
Monsanto technology without also agreeing
to buy overpriced new seed. Monsanto ties
unwanted new seed to the right to purchase
the patented technology. This tying is not
for the benefit only of Monsanto. Instead,
its seed company licensees derive a financial
windfall since farmers have to buy
overpriced new seed from the seed
companies each year. A farmer cannot
purchase the technology unless he also
agrees to purchase new seed each year.27
Disputing the Federal Circuit’s statement that the anticompetitive
effect of Monsanto’s policy was “part and parcel of the patent system’s
role in creating incentives for potential inventors,” McFarling contended
26

Id. at *1.

27

Id. at *9.
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that the beneficiaries of Monsanto’s licensing scheme were not primarily
Monsanto but rather the seed companies, which did not invent the patented
technology. McFarling cited record evidence that when a U.S. soybean
farmer purchases a 50-pound bag of RR seed, he is paying not only a
$6.50 technology fee (patent royalty) to Monsanto but also an additional
$18.00 to the seed company for the seed germplasm. In contrast, a farmer
who saves and replants the second-generation seed will have invested only
about $7.00 per bag of seed.28 According to McFarling, the Technology
Agreement ensured that “the purchase of new seed is ‘bundled’ with the
technology as a way to extract monopoly profits from farmers, who would
otherwise simply pay the technology fee to Monsanto and use saved
seeds.” Moreover, “farmers consider saved seed to be superior in quality”
over new purchased seed.”29
McFarling’s certiorari petition also challenged the validity of
Monsanto’s patents, charging the Federal Circuit with “radically
extend[ing] the previous reach of the patent laws as this Court has defined
them.” McFarling noted that Monsanto’s ‘435 patent claimed both the
genetically-altered seed and its progeny; that is, both the first- and secondgeneration seed.

According to McFarling, the “second generation of

genetically-altered soybeans is not a ‘human-made’ invention,” as
required by the Court’s decisions such as Diamond v. Chakrabarty,30 but
rather is a product of nature “created by God.”31
28

Id. at *5.

29

Id. at *7.

30

See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980) (“the relevant distinction [i]s
not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living
or not, and human-made inventions.”).

31

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McFarling, No. 04-31, 2004 WL 1535852, at *13*14.

10
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In an order issued October 12, 2004, the Supreme Court invited the
Acting Solicitor General to file a brief in the case expressing the views of
the United States.32 The government recommended denial of certiorari,
primarily on the ground that the Federal Circuit’s decision did not merit
review because it “involve[d] a narrow application of established legal
principles to a specific factual context involving a self-replicating
product.”33 The government admitted that McFarling’s initial pleadings
had appeared to raise a “novel question” concerning whether the patent
exhaustion doctrine34 limited Monsanto’s ability to enforce post-sale
restrictions on the use of its patented seed,35 but contended that McFarling
had failed to properly preserve that issue for review by the Supreme

32

McFarling v. Monsanto Co., 125 S. Ct. 348 (2004).

33

Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 10, McFarling v. Monsanto Co., No. 04-31,
2005 WL 1277857 (S. Ct. May 27, 2005). The determinative inquiry for patent misuse is
whether a patentee’s challenged practice has “’impermissibly broadened the scope of the
patent grant.’” Id. (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)). Here, both the first-generation seed sold by Monsanto and its partners and
the second-generation seed produced by the first-generation seed were within the scope
of the Monsanto patents in suit, and thus patent misuse was not made out. See id.
34

The patent exhaustion doctrine provides that “sale of [a patented product] exhausts the
monopoly in that article and the patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent,
control the use or disposition of the article.” United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S.
241, 250 (1942).
35

See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 11, McFarling, No. 04-31, 2005 WL
1277857 (observing that Federal Circuit’s earlier rejection of McFarling’s patent
exhaustion defense at preliminary injunction stage involved “the novel question whether
(and, if so, to what extent) the patent-exhaustion doctrine applies to restrictions on the use
of a materially identical patented product that was produced by the patented product sold
by the patentee.”). In the government’s view, such a question “may not recur with any
frequency, and it would be beneficial to have a fully considered resolution of that
question in the lower courts.” Id.
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Court.36 The Supreme Court followed the government’s recommendation
and denied certiorari on June 27, 2005.37
IV. Discussion
Those who oppose the farming of GM crops may applaud the
result, if not the reasoning, of the Federal Circuit’s decision in McFarling
II. Allowing Monsanto to prohibit the saving and replanting of secondgeneration seed and forcing farmers to buy new GM seed each season may
limit the amount of GM crop grown; farmers will simply not be able to
afford to grow as much as if they were permitted to save seed. Whether
Monsanto’s practices actually have a chilling effect on the planting of GM
crops is questionable, however, in light of the fact that 75% of the
soybeans grown in the U.S. today are genetically modified.38

The

practical result of Monsanto’s licensing practices may disproportionately
impact small farmers, concentrating GM crop growth among larger
farming operations which are better able to bear the financial burden.
In this regard McFarling’s challenge to Monsanto’s licensing
practices resonates well beyond the U.S. and other industrialized
economies that dominate agribusiness. Despite McFarling’s protest, the
added financial burden of having to buy new seed each season is not a
novel problem in the U.S., where many farmers have done so since the
36

See id.

37

McFarling v. Monsanto Co., 125 S. Ct. 2956 (2005). Another reason why certiorari
was denied in McFarling II may be that review was recently granted in another
patent/antitrust case discussed infra Part IV, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink,
Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2937 (2005). It is relatively rare for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari
in patent cases and even more unlikely that the Court would accept two patent cases
involving antitrust issues for review at the same time.
38
See PETER PRINGLE, FOOD, INC.: MENDEL TO MONSANTO–THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF
THE BIOTECH HARVEST 189 (2003) (stating that by 2003, in America 75% of the soybean
crop was GM).

12
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introduction of hybrid varieties in the 1920s and 1930s.39 The longer-term
and potentially much more onerous impact of seed-saving prohibitions is
seen by comparing the plight of subsistence farmers in developing
countries. In these countries, about 80 percent of farmers save seed for
replanting in order to reduce costs.40 It is unclear how or when developing
country farmers will share in the promise of GM crops. As concluded by
the 2004 annual report of the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), the real problem with GM crops is not safety, but
rather access to the benefits of the technology.41

Research and

development into GM crops has not yet been sufficiently aimed at helping
establish food security in the poorest countries of the world. The poor
have been left at the sidelines of the “gene revolution,” and seed-saving
prohibitions contribute to their exclusion.
The Federal Circuit in McFarling II rejected as tantamount to
compulsory licensing McFarling’s proposal for a “less restrictive
alternative,” that farmers should be allowed to save seed and replant it
while paying a technology fee to Monsanto for the amount of seed

39

See FELICIA WU & WILLIAM P. BUTZ, THE FUTURE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS:
LESSONS FROM THE GREEN REVOLUTION 52 (Rand Corp. 2004); id. at 50 (noting that
hybrid corn was first grown on U.S. farms in the 1920s and 1930s). “[B]y its nature,
hybrid seed precludes farmers from saving their own seed for planting. . . . [I]f a farmer
achieves good results with hybrid XYZ, and wants to grow more of the same hybrid the
following year, he must again obtain hybrid seed produced by the controlled crossing of
the same two or more parental lines used to produce the hybrid in prior years. . . . Only
those who control the parent lines from which a hybrid is made can reproduce it.”
William L. Brown, Plant Genetic Resources: A View from the Seed Industry, in SEEDS
AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 218, 224
(Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr., ed., Duke Univ. Press 1988).
40

See WU & BUTZ, supra note 39, at 52.

41

Editorial, A Call for a Gene Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2004, at A26.
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The court likely viewed the proposal as one that would

effectively compel Monsanto to give the farmers permission to “use” the
patented trait in raising a new crop, rather than allowing Monsanto to
exercise its statutory right to exclude others from that use.43 From a patent
law perspective, the Federal Circuit’s rejection of McFarling’s proposal is
not surprising.

United States courts have historically disfavored

compulsory licensing and any remedy considered tantamount thereto.44
However, the Federal Circuit did not address the antitrust
consequences of the existence of less restrictive alternatives. Restraints in
patent licenses between parties in a vertical arrangement (such as
Monsanto and McFarling) are generally analyzed under the antitrust rule
of reason,45 which considers not just anticompetitive effect but also the
antitrust defendant’s pro-competitive justifications for the restraint. For an
apparently anticompetitive restraint to be redeemed, it must not only
promote a legitimate objective (as in this case, maintaining incentives for
innovation through recouping of R&D investment), but must also do so
significantly better than the less restrictive alternatives.46 As McFarling’s
42

Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 2956 (2005).

43

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2005).

44

E.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (describing
compulsory licensing as "rarity" in U.S. patent system); see also EDITH TILTON PENROSE,
THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 172 (1951) (explaining that
compulsory licensing has been “violently opposed” in the U.S. because it “can be such a
serious derogation of the monopoly ‘rights’ of the patentee”); Robert P. Merges &
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839,
911 (1990) (describing compulsory licensing as “anathema” to U.S. patent law). The
U.S. Congress considered but ultimately dropped the idea of compulsory licensing as part
of the 1952 Patent Act. See Dawson Chem. Co., 448 U.S. at 215 n.21.
45

See Licensing Guidelines, supra note 17, at § 3.4.

46

See PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1505 (2002). See also Licensing
Guidelines, supra note 17, at § 4.2 (stating that “[t]he existence of practical and
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certiorari petition points out, Monsanto has in fact exercised less
restrictive alternatives outside the U.S. market. In Argentina, Monsanto
permits soybean farmers to save and replant patented varieties upon
payment of an annual fee.47 Among the 17 countries that now permit the
growing of GM crops, Argentina is second only to the U.S. in terms of
acreage.48
Is Monsanto’s seed saving prohibition a legitimate field of use
restriction on its patented GM technology? The Federal Circuit’s decision
strongly suggests that absent the unique fact that the progeny of the
patented seed is genetically identical and thus also within the ‘435 patent’s
scope, Monsanto’s field of use restriction would not pass antitrust muster.
The court left unresolved the question of whether a patent licensor may
properly impose license restrictions on goods made by,

yet not

incorporating, the licensed good, limiting its decision to the unique facts

significantly less restrictive alternatives is relevant to a determination of whether a
restraint is reasonably necessary.”).
47

Roger A. McEowen, Legal Issues Related to the Use and Ownership of Genetically
Modified Organisms, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 611, 652 n.244 (2004) (citing David Dechant,
Monsanto Wants Extended Seed Royalties, CROPCHOICE, May 22, 2003, available at
http://www.mindfully.org/GE/2003/Monsanto-Seed-Royalties22may03.htm). Dechant’s
article translates a Monsanto Argentina website as providing the following terms to
farmers: “Following the purchase of the seed and before the next crop year begins, the
producer needs to make a sworn statement attesting to the amount of seed saved for
planting. After turning over the sworn statement, Monsanto will emit a debit note for
royalties of the value of US $1.50 for every 25 kilos (55 pounds) of seed. This
mechanism will repeat itself every time the farmer saves seed bought under this system.”
Id.

48

See International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Global
Status of Biotech Crops in 2004 (chart),
http://www.isaaa.org/kc/CBTNews/press_release/briefs32/figures/Biotech_map_acreage.
jpg (last visited Sept. 17, 2005) (reporting that in 2004 the U.S. had 117.6 million acres
of biotech crops while Argentina had 40 million acres; Canada, Brazil, and China round
out the top five countries in terms of biotech crop acreage).
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But given the rapid advances in agricultural

biotechnology, such a scenario is not unlikely to come before the court in
the future. Consider a hypothetical genetic modification of a crop that
would result in the production of second-generation seeds sufficiently
different in genetic makeup that the patent on the first-generation seed
does not read on them.
Expanding the hypothetical beyond the GM crop sector, consider a
patent on a transgenic mouse that may potentially serve as an important
laboratory research tool in the development of a new drug for treating
cancer. A license granted to permit use of the patented mouse might
properly restrict the licensee’s use of the mouse to solely research
applications, or alternatively to commercial-only applications. But what if
the license further imposed restrictions on the use of any new drug product
developed through testing with the mouse? Consider a hypothetical patent
license that included a provision barring the use of any resulting new drug
for diseases other than cancer, or one that limited the nationality of the
patients that could receive the drug, or that imposed geographic
restrictions on the distribution of the drug. Such restrictions would seem
clearly beyond the scope of the patent on the transgenic mouse and
presumably would be treated by the courts as an unreasonable restraint of
trade in violation of the antitrust laws.50

Should the unique fact of

49

Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 2956 (2005) (stating that “[o]ur case law has not addressed in general terms the status
of such restrictions placed on goods made by, yet not incorporating, the licensed good
under the patent misuse doctrine. . . . [b]ecause the ‘435 patent would read on all
generations of soybeans produced, we hold that the restrictions in the Technology
Agreement prohibiting the replanting of the second generation of ROUNDUP READY®
soybeans do not extend Monsanto’s rights under the patent statute.”).

50

These seemingly anticompetitive restrictions on the use of a product made by the
patented invention should be distinguished from a patentee’s ability to recover royalties
based on the commercial value of that product. Many patent licenses in the life sciences
impose “reach-through” royalties. The propriety of such royalties is the subject of
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genetically identical progeny in McFarling II justify more favorable
treatment?
Although it was not clearly preserved on appeal,51 McFarling’s
additional argument that Monsanto’s patents cover “products of nature”
not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 also raises interesting questions.
The argument parallels a position recently adopted by Federal Circuit
Judge Gajarsa in his concurrence in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex
Corp.52 In that case, the patent claim at issue broadly recited “crystalline
paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate.” A structurally similar compound,
paroxetine anhydrate, which was not the subject of any patents, had a
tendency to spontaneously transform itself into the patented paroxetine
hemihydrate, without the intent of the accused infringer (a manufacturer of
the unpatented paroxetine anhydrate). Rejecting the notion of “inevitable
infringement” liability, Judge Gajarsa

took the position that “patent

claims drawn broadly enough to encompass products that spread, appear,
and ‘reproduce’ through natural processes cover subject matter

not

patentable under Section 101--and are therefore invalid.”53 In future cases
of this sort, Judge Gajarsa suggested, “[i]inventors wishing to claim
ongoing debate and has not yet been squarely addressed by the Federal Circuit. Cf.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 02-1052, 02-1065, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
27796, at *31 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003) (noting that “[w]hile this court does not opine on
the applicability of a reach-through royalty in this case, the presence or absence of
stacking royalties for research tools may color the character of a hypothetical negotiation
between Merck and Integra for access to the RGD peptide technology.”).
51

The Federal Circuit’s decision noted that McFarling had not challenged the validity of
Monsanto’s patents at the trial court level. See McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1340 (noting
that McFarling “failed to raise or argue the alleged invalidity of the ‘435 patent as a
defense to the breach of the Technology Agreement claim or as an element of its patent
misuse defense, and at this stage of the proceedings we deem the argument to have been
waived for purposes of deciding this appeal.”).
52

See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

53

Id. at 1331 (Gajarasa, J., concurring).
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products that can either be synthesized in laboratories or generated by
natural processes may protect themselves by incorporating negative
limitation terms like ‘non-natural’ or ‘non-human’ into the claims that
they submit for examination.”
Monsanto’s ‘435 patent claims do not contain such limitations.54
If the Supreme Court were to view the patent claims to second-generation
seed as encompassing subject matter that is not patentable, this would
transform McFarling’s tying claim into a “conventional” one, by which
the patentee is forcing a licensee to purchase unpatented material as a
condition for receiving the license.

The Supreme Court has recently

shown a rather unexpected interest in the limits of patentable subject
matter,55 which may have contributed to the Court’s initial interest in
McFarling II.56

54

See U.S. Patent No. 5,633,435, claim 79 (filed Sept. 13, 1994) (“A seed of a
glyphosate-tolerant plant of claim 28").

55

Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 1413, 1413 (2005)
(Order inviting the Acting Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the
United States limited to following question:
Respondent's patent claims a method for detecting a
form of vitamin B deficiency, which focuses upon a
correlation in the human body between elevated
levels of certain amino acids and deficient levels of
vitamin B. The method consists of the following:
First, measure the level of the relevant amino acids
using any device, whether the device is, or is not,
patented; second, notice whether the amino acid
level is elevated and, if so, conclude that a vitamin B
deficiency exists. Is the patent invalid because one
cannot patent “laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas”? Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 185, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed.2d 155 (1981)).

56

A similar argument of non-patentability was raised, without success, by Canadian
farmer Perry Schmeiser in his battle with Monsanto over the right to save and replant RR
canola seeds. The Canadian Supreme Court upheld the patentability of Monsanto’s
Canadian patent claims directed to genes conferring herbicide resistance and plant cells
transformed with such genes. See Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2004 Can. Sup. Ct.
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Lastly, with respect to McFarling’s tying claim, recent changes in
the Federal Circuit’s law on patent tying may also make that claim more
feasible. The Federal Circuit decided McFarling II several months prior
to its ruling in Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tools Works, Inc.57 The
court held in Independent Ink that in the patent tying context, a patent
owner is presumed to have market power and the burden of rebutting this
presumption is placed on the patentee. Although the Federal Circuit’s
holding in Independent Ink is contrary to modern economic thought58 and
has resulted in a grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court,59 as long as the
decision stands it makes the challenge to a tying arrangement before the
Federal Circuit substantially easier. In McFarling II, however, the Federal
Circuit never reached the issue of whether Monsanto had power in the
relevant market for its patented inventions; rather, it rejected McFarling’s
threshold argument that the Technology Agreement’s seed saving and
replanting prohibition constituted a tying arrangement.

LEXIS 32, at *26-*27 (2004). The Schmeiser majority interpreted the claims as
encompassing practice of the patented invention in plants regenerated from the patented
cells, whether the plants were located inside a laboratory or in the field, id. at *27, and
rejected the dissent’s narrow construction that would have limited the claims to the
recited genes and plant cells only when in isolated laboratory form. Id. at *24. The
majority concluded that “[w]hether or not patent protection for the gene and the cell
extends to activities involving the plant is not relevant to the patent’s validity [but rather]
relates only to the factual circumstances in which infringement will be found to have
taken place . . . .” Id. at *27.
57

Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
125 S. Ct. 2937 (2005).

58

The new economic learning of antitrust law teaches that ownership of a patent does not
necessarily confer market power due to the possibility of consumers turning to
noninfringing alternatives in the event of a price increase for the patented invention. See,
e.g. Licensing Guidelines, supra note 17, at § 5.3 (stating with respect to tying that the
antitrust agencies “will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily
confers market power upon its owner.”).
59

Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2937 (2005).
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Conclusion
As a matter of patent law, the Federal Circuit’s decision in

McFarling II is unremarkable. The court has not shown a propensity to
find patent owners guilty of patent misuse.60 But the Federal Circuit’s
relatively summary dismissal of the antitrust challenges raised by
McFarling bears further scrutiny. A recognized “dissonance” exists at the
intersection of the patent and antitrust laws,61 which has only been
exacerbated by conflicts between the Federal Circuit’s patent and antitrust
decisions and those of the regional circuits.62 McFarling II presented the
Supreme Court with an attractive vehicle for imparting some much needed
clarity at the intersection of these two increasingly intertwined legal
regimes. Although the Court declined to review McFarling II, the issues
raised by the case are likely to recur with increasing frequency as
Monsanto and other agribusiness giants continue their use of patents to
control the growth and distribution of GM crops.

60

See, e.g., CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1328 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2000); C.R.
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Va. Panel Corp. v.
MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868-71 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

61

See Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997)
(observing that “[a]t the border of intellectual property monopolies and antitrust markets
lies a field of dissonance yet to be harmonized by statute or the Supreme Court.”).

62

Compare id. at 1219 (holding that ownership of patents was presumptively valid reason
for refusal to sell or license patented parts to independent repair services, but that
presumption was rebuttable where patent ownership was mere pretext for masking
anticompetitive behavior), with CSU, L.L.C., 203 F.3d at 1327 (explicitly rejecting Ninth
Circuit’s “pretext” approach and refusing to inquire into a patent owner’s subjective
motivations for refusing to license.).
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